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This paper offers and tests a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general




our model is that the current employer has
relative to other firms. This informational
advantage gives the employer an ex post monopsony power over the worker which encourages
the firm to provide training. We show that the model can lead to multiple equilibria. In one
equilibrium quits are endogenously high, and as a result employers have limited monopsony
power and are willing to supply only little training, while in another equilibrium quits are low
and training high. We also derive predictions from our model not shared by other explanations
of firm sponsored training. Using microdata from Germany, we show that the predictions of the
specific human capital model are rejected, while our model receives support from the data.
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A large portion of human capital accumulation in the form of training and on-the-
job learning takes place inside firms. Becker (1965) and Mincer (1972) provide
a systematic explanation of training investments and the associated wages of
workers. This standard theory draws a crucial distinction between general and
firm-specific training. General training will increase workers’ wages in a range
of employment opportunities, thus it is the worker who has to pay for general
training, The firm should only pay for the firm-specific component of training
which does not help the worker receive higher wages elsewhere. However, these
predictions seem to be at odds with reality. In Germany, firms voluntarily offer
apprenticeships to workers entering the labor market. Although general skills
are an important component of these programs, much of the financial burden is
borne by the firm (see Nell et al., 1983). The same is true in Japan where training
and mentoring within companies is more important in many areas than formal
schooling (e.g. there are no business schools in Japan). Many labor economists
also believe that U.S. firms provide some general training to their workers while
bearing some of the initial outlays, for example in the form of tuition assistance
or as in-house training in general skills (see Osterman , 1993, for a discussion of
the U.S. evidence).
In order to explain firms’ investments in general skills, some labor market
imperfection must exist so that the mobility of workers is restricted and that,
employers earn rents on trained workers. The mechanism we propose in this paper
is the adverse selection story also analyzed by Waldman (1984), Greenwald (1986)
and Gibbons and Katz (1991) among others. The talents and skills of young
workers who arrive in the market are in general unknown. Some will be more
productive and able at tasks in which they choose to specialize than others. The
early years of the worker’s career constitute the period in which more information
is accumulated about his ability. However, most of this information is gathered by
the employer and not transmitted to outsiders. The presence of this asymmetric
information has already been noted in the literature. The crucial step we take
is to note the link between the firm’s ex post rnonopsony power over the worker
arising from this informational advantage and training incentives.
Given that the firm is able to obtain part of the marginal product of the
worker, it also has an interest in increasing this marginal product by investing
1in the worker’s human capital. Workers, on the other hand, may not be willing
to pay for general skills themselves because they realize that at lemt part of the
returns will be appropriated by the firm. As a result, in stark contrast to the
standard Beckerian model of training, a firm which wants to attract workers to
its apprenticeship program may have to pay not only for the training but also offer
apprentices a training wage above their initial productivity. There is no need to
resort to credit constraints of workers for this to be true.
The failure of the U.S. economy to generate as much training as Germany or
Japan is sometimes blamed on the higher turnover in the U.S. (e.g. Blinder and
Krueger, 1991) 1. However, if training is general to a large extent, this statement
cannot be reconciled with the standard model of training: with or without quits,
firms will have to pay the full marginal product of the worker in the outside
markets. Thus, exogenous differences in turnover alone do not explain the different,
practices in financing general training. In our model quit rates are endogenous
and play an important role for equilibrium wages and training levels. Because
quit rates determine the composition of the second-hand market for workers, they
influence the wages that outside firms are willing to pay and thus the degree
of monopsony that the current employer has over the workers. This channel
will also imply that our model is able to generate multiple equilibria, or more
importantly, very different equilibrium outcomes resulting from small differences
in underlying parameter values. For example, an economy could be characterized
by high training and low quits. Because workers who quit receive low wages,
the apprenticeship firm will have substantial monopsony power which supports a
high level of training. In a different equilibrium the same economy will have low
training and high quits. In this equilibrium, quitters receive relatively high wages,
leave their firms with a high frequency, and the firm will only enjoy moderate
monopsony power. Paradoxically, the equilibrium with high quits, which achieves
a better allocation of workers to jobs, maybe less efficient since the level of training
is lower.
A model of training would be somehow incomplete without an explicit treat-
ment of the possibility of active poaching or raids by other firms, especially given
the prevalence of this type of behavior in the U.S. labor market. However, here too
lTurnover is certainly much higher in the U.S. than in Germany. Topel and Ward (1992)
report that in the U.S. labor market, the median number of jobs that a worker with 10 years
of experience held is 6. We calculate the same statistic to be 2 in our 1979 data and 1 in our
1985 data for Germany. However, it is important to emphasize that in our model, the turnover
rate is not exogenous, instead turnover, training and wages will be simultaneously determined
in equilibrium.
2asymmetric information is more powerful than previously envisioned. We show
that raids lead to an extreme form of the winner’s curse which often makes this
strategy unprofitable, and as a result the monopsony power of the apprenticeship
firm is preserved. Nevertheless, in the presence of raids there will be a unique
equilibrium with no more training than in the case without poaching.
While our theory, at lemt to us, has obvious appeal, a real test involves deriving
new and different predictions and confronting them with data. We do this in
the second part of the paper. In particular, we look at the wages of German
apprentices who stay in their firm, who are laid off or quit their firm voluntarily,
and compare them with the wages of apprentices who quit for ezogenous reasons,
that is to go to the military. West Germany has had a draft system since 1957,
but not all males get drafted. There is some screening on physical fitness, but
otherwise the selection into the military is random. Our model predicts that
military quitters should have higher wages than voluntary quitters (and laid off
workers) which is confirmed in the data. This test has an obvious similarity
to Gibbons and Katz’s (1991) empirical investigation of adverse selection in the
U.S. labor market. However, we also draw a stronger prediction from our model
that is not shared by other models. Because the firm has monopsony power
over workers who stay, they are paid below their marginal product. In contrast,
military quitters, thanks to their exogenolls reason of separation, are freed from
this monopsony power. While they will be less able than stayers on average,
they can have higher wages. In fact, we find that their wages are very close
to or above those of stayers. Further, using proxies for ability available in our
data set, we also present evidence which suggests that, despite their higher or
equal earnings, military quitters are less able than stayers! We also contrast our
empirical findings to the implications of a standard human capital model where
there are no information asymmetries and training is firm-specific, and we show
that they cannot easily be reconciled with this alternative.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we lay
out the basic model. Section 3 discusses extensions to the model, in particular
the potential of raids on trained workers by outside firms. We also compare our
model to related literatures. Section 4 outlines the testable implications of the
model. Section 5 describes the data and section 6 discusses our empirical findings.
In section 7 we conclude by drawing comparative lessons for the U.S.2. Theory: The Basic Model
We start with the simplest model to obtain the sharpest predictions. The next
section deals with extensions aimed at demonstrating the robustness of the model.
2.1. Description of the Environment
The world lasts for two periods. Firms can hire workers at the beginning of either
period. At all points, firms have constant returns to scale. All firms and workers
are risk-neutral. Also, there is no discounting between periods. During the first,
period, firms can offer training to the workers they hire. The amount of this
training is denoted by t. With or without training workers produce nothing during
the first period.
In the second period each worker produces
y = a(t)q (2.1)
where a(t) is the general human capital and q is the ability of the worker. The
assumption that all human capital is general is of course extreme, but it will
demonstrate that none of our results are driven by firm-specific human capital.
It is important for our results that ability and training are complementary; the
multiplicative specification of (2.1) captures this in a simple fashion. Regarding
a(t) we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 a(t) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and
concave with limt+o a’(t) = m and limt+~ a’ (t) = O for some O < f < m.
The cost of training each worker is given by t. Ability is distributed according
to a continuous and differentiable distribution function F(q) with support [0, ~s”P].
In the first period, no one knows the ability of a worker, though the distribution
from which these abilities are drawn is common knowledge. At the end of the
first period, the firm learns the ability of each worker it employs. Note quite
importantly that this is independent of whether and how much training is offered
to the worker. Training neither facilitates nor leads to learning. The reason firms
train will not be because training enables them to learn better.
The sequence of events is as follows. In the first period, firms decide how many
workers to hire and how much training to give them. Throughout the analysis,
we will assume that each firm employs a continuum of workers, At this stage the
firm does not observe the ability of the workers. At the end of period 1, the firm
4observes the ability of all its employees, and it makes a unique wage offer to these
workers, which we denote by w(t). At this point, it may also desire to lay off some
of these workers. 2 However, the firm is aware that some of the workers it wants
to keep will nevertheless leave. The reason for quits is because the workers realize
that they are not getting on with their colleagues or supervisor, or because their
spouse moves to a different city or simply because they have realized that they
are more suited to another profession or environment. To capture these and other
reasons for voluntary quits we assume that with probability A each worker receives
a negative taste shock 8. The disutility shock 0 has a distribution function G(6).
This shock is never observed by any agent other than the worker in question.
We now make some assumptions about the distribution functions:
Assumption 2 G(z) is twice differentiable and is log-concave in x.
Assumption 3 F(z) is twice differentiable and fZ qd~(q) is log-concave in x.
Log-concavity ensures well-behaved second-order conditions and comparative
static results (Burdett, 1979) and has become a standard assumption in models
of this type. It simply requires that the log of the function in question is concave,
most well-known distribution functions including uniform and normal satisfy this
requirement. These assumptions are by no means necessary for our results, but
they simplify the exposition and proofs considerably.
Workers who quit receive wage offers from outside firms. These firms do not
observe the ability level of the worker prior to making a binding wage offer, thus
offers are based on their beliefs about the workers. Another important factor is
that outside firms never observe whether a worker has quit voluntarily or has been
laid off. However, the exact training level that the worker has received is always
observable.3 We denote the outside wage of a worker who quits or is laid off and
has a level of training t by w(t).
‘Throughout the paper we assume that the output of the workers is not verifiable (for in-
stance, only the overall output of the firm is observable to outside parties), thlls neither the first
employer nor future employers can write contingent wage cent racts.
3This is a reasonable assumption since outside firms know how much training different ap-
prenticeship firms offer but can never ascertain whether the worker has really quit or anticipating
that he would be laid off, he jumped the gun. For instance, consider the case where quits and
layoffs were distinguishable and the worker learned his type an instant before the firm, he would
immediately quit and thus there would be no layoffs, hence distinguishing quits and layoffs
would convey no useful information. A theory of training whereby outside firms do not observe
the training decisions of the apprenticeship firm can be developed in a very straighforward man-
ner (e.g. Chang and Wang, 1994). However, as well as being less realistic, especially for the
5Finally, we impose a freeentry condition on firms at,all points in time. That is,
in equilibrium no firm will earn positive profits. As we will see this may imply that
apprentices (workers in period 1) need to be paid a positive wage even though
they are not productive during this period. We denote this wage by W. An
assumption we make is that firms only compete for workers by offering a training
wage W, which is not contingent on the level of training, and then unilaterally
decide the level of training to maximize profits. This basically corresponds to
assuming that contracts on training levels are hard to enforce, for instance, the
amount of training is not perfectly verifiable. An alternative assumption is that
firms offer a package consisting of training levels and wages [W, t] to attract young
workers. The model is solved under this assumption in section 3.
2.2. The Competitive Equilibrium (No Information Asymmetries)
The model we have is non-competitive due to the informational asymmetries. If
the ability level q of each worker is observed in the second period by all firms, then
we obtain Becker’s standard model.4 In this case, outside wages of workers who
quit and have ability q and training t are given by v(t) = a(t)q. Thus no firm will
be able to retain its trained workers unless it pays this wage. As a consequence,
the training firm enjoys no rents, and there will be no training unless the worker
is willing and able to pay for his training. If we impose the credit constraint that
W > 0, the model delivers to = 0, On the other hand, if W is unconstrained,
then we have the optimal amount of training that is
t’ = arg max /~~(t)dF(n) -t (2.2)
and the corresponding training wage is W = –tc. We will contrast our solution
with this competitive (Beckerian) equilibrium later.
2.3. Equilibrium With Adverse Selection
In the rest of the paper we will analyze the case in which F(q) is non-degenerate
and q is not observed by firms other than the current employer. We begin with
German case, such a model is driven by the same features as a model where human capital is
firm specific, and therefore no real contrast to the standard Beckerian story.
40bviously, the Beckerian model is also obtained in the limiting case where F(q) is degenerate
at some level fi.the assumption that there is no possibility of poaching or raids. We will return
to this issue in the following section.
2.3.1. The Equilibrium Concept
The equilibrium concept we will use is Perfect Bayesian. We have at hand a large
and complex game. The number of players is infinite, and there is a continuum
of information sets that can be reached in the second period of the economy
(depending on the training level of workers).’
An allocation is an equilibrium iff
1. All workers are taking the optimal quit decisions given the wage offer and
the outside wage.
2. All apprenticeship firms (firms with trainees) are choosing the optimal lay-
off, wage, and training rules, fi”(t), w*(t), t“ and the optimal training wage
W*, taking as given the outside wage offers and the workers’ optimal quit
decisions at all points in the game (including the optimal layoff decisions for
the training levels that do not arise in equilibrium).
3. All outside firms are making optimal offers, v(t), to workers looking for a
job in the second period given their beliefs regarding the ability of these
workers.
5We have a game in which the informed players (apprenticeship firms) move before the
uninformed players (out side firms) and in this type of games the concept of Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium strengthened by some signaling requirement is often used. However, it tl~rns out
that in our case the Perfect Bayesian concept is sufficient because we can determine the relevant
beliefs in all information sets. An alternative way of expressing this is that all of the Perfect
Bayesian Equilibria of this game satisfy the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) and
even stronger refinements. The key to this “good performance” of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
is that before the crucial information sets of the uninformed players are reached, the informed
player has a decision that pins down the subsequent beliefs. More explicitly, the game-theoretic
problem could be that the information set, in which workers with other levels of training (t # t“)
look for a job in the second period, is not reached. Thus it may be conjectured that v(t) is free
except at v(t’ ) which will then introduce a number of unreasonable equilibria. However, suppose
that a firm deviates and chooses a training level t # t*, are beliefs free? The answer is no because
after this choice of training the firm has a choice of which workers to lay-off and here it will
always find it profitable to layoff workers that have q < w(t) /a(t), thus beliefs of outsiders even
when t# t*are determined.4. The beliefs of outside firms are derived by Bayes’ Rule in all information
sets that are reached.
The set of functions and numbers {v(t), w“(t), ~’(t), t“, W*} is an equilibrium
if conditions 1.-4. above hold.
2.3.2. Analysis and Characterization of Equilibria
Denote the probability that a worker with training level t quits by q[w(t), v(t)].
A worker with training t who quits receives v(t) whereas if he stays he will get
w(t), but he will also suffer disutility f? with probability A. The optimal decision
is to quit iff
v(t) – w(t) + e >0.
Therefore, the probability of quitting is
q[w(t), v(t)] = A[l – G[w(t) – v(t)]].
Now recall that the firm is forced to pay the same wage to all remaining
workers of the same training level. Hence the firm’s layoff decision will take a
simple cut-off form whereby all workers above a skill level ~(t) will be kept.
Since the firm offers W first and then decides how much training to offer and
chooses the retention and wage policies, the problem can then be written as
~(~l)t rI = [1– q[w(t), v(t)]] /m [a(t)q – w(t)] dF(q) – t – w.
%
(2.3)
In words, the firm takes the wage that other firms offer to quitters, w(t), as given
and maximizes its profit by choosing the cut-off function for layoffs ~’(t), wage
function to be paid to all workers w“(t), and the training level t’. In equilibrium,
we only observe fi*(L*) and w* (t”). Nevertheless, the rest of these functions need
to be determined as part of the equilibrium strategies in order to pin down the
off-the-equilibrium-path behavior. We will first deal with the determination of
fi*(t) and w“(t) and then return to t’.
The first order conditions are (second order conditions are satisfied given as-
sumptions 2 and 3, see proof of Proposition 1):
w*(t)
fin(t) = ~, (2.4)
8-[1 - q(w”(t), ?J(t))][l - F(fi*(t))] - ~~[w;$;;;(~)l
for all t. The optimal level oft, -t*is given by:
~ ,,,[ () -: a t q –’w*(t)]dF(q) = 0,
(2.5)
[1 - q[w*(t*),v(t*)]] J;,*, Q!’(t*)qdF(q) -1 = o. (2.6)
Next, in order to attract workers, the firm will be willing to offer a training wage
W’ as high as the maximized value of (2.3). Thus
W’* = max{O; [1 – q[w*(t*), v(t*)]] ~~,.l[a(t”)q – w“(t’)]d~(q) – t“}. (2.7)
since these wages cannot be negative (by the credit constraint of the workers).
Although our model works equally well without credit constraints, to impose
the restriction W’ > 0 is a good way of highlighting our differences from the
competitive (no information asymmetries) model. Proposition 3 below will show
that in equilibrium W’ will sometimes be strictly positive, thus this restriction will
not bind.
Finally, we need to determine how outside wages for quitters are determined.
Due to free-entry these workers will be paid their expected marginal product,
which by Bay-’ rule gives:
v(t) =
q[w”(t), ?J(t)]a(t)q + [1 – q[w”(t), v(t)]] J)”(’) a(t)qdF(q)
(2.8)
q[w’(t), v(t)]+ [1 – q[w”(t), v(t)] ]F(fi*(t))
Equations (2.4), (2.5), (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) determine v(t), w“(t), q“(t), t* and
w*.
Proposition 1. (i) An equilibrium, with w*(t), v(t) and H“(t)continuously dif-
ferentiable, exists and is characterized by (2.4)-(2.8).
(ii) Denote the set of equilibrium training levels by ‘Tn’. Then Vta E T“’, to =
O < t“ < t’ where to and t’ are the training levels in the economy without infor-
mational asymmetries and, respectively, with
9
and without credit constraints.Proof See the appendix.
Part (i) establishes the existence of a well-behaved equilibrium. For the pur-
poses of our paper, the more important result is in part (ii) which characterizes
some important properties of the equilibrium, namely that the amount of training
is always positive but less than first-best.
Because in our economy the firm will have an ex post monopsony power over its
employees, it will be able to capture a portion of their marginal product. Given the
multiplicative structure of ability and training in equation (2.1), this also implies
that the firm can increase the monopsony rents by training. Therefore, the model
always generates a positive amount of training. Clearly, this is higher than the
training level of zero (to) the competitive model would achieve when workers are
unable to pay for their own training. As commented above, the multiplicative
structure of ability and training per se is not crucial for this result. Rather the
import ant feature is that a(t) and q are complements. In contrast, if (2.1) were
additive, i.e. y(t) = a(t) + q, then the firm would still have ex post monopsony
power, but would only obtain the proportion of the worker’s marginal product
coming from q. All increases coming from a(t) would be reflected in the worker’s
outside wage.
Remember that the firm lays off some workers and other workers quit. Training
of these workers is costly but the firm only reaps the benefits from workers who
stay with the firm. Therefore, in this non-competitive structure, due to the leakage
arising from layoffs and quits, the training level is also less than the unconstrained,
full-information first-best (t’).
Let us turn to the characterization of equilibrium next.
Proposition 2. (i) There can exist multiple equilibria.
(ii) Suppose there exist multiple equilibria and that Assumption 2 holds, then
for any two equilibria a and b, we have that v“(t) > Vb(t) % q“[w”(t), v(t)] >
q~[w~(t), v(t)] e t“ < tb.
Proof See the appendix.
Our model therefore endogenously generates two equilibria for the same pa-
rameter values; one with high training and low turnover and the other with low
training and high turnover.
Let us explain the intuition of this result and then give an example. The RHS
of (2.8) is increasing in the probability of quitting q. That is, at a given level of
10training t, 8V(t)/dq >0. More voluntary quits imply that the quality of the labor
pool in the secondary market is higher. To see this consider the case in which
q = O. Then all workers who are looking for a job must have been laid off, and
thus they must have a level of ability less than fi. In contrast, when q >0, some
of the quitters may be of very high ability but leave voluntarily because they were
not happy with their jobs. Hence, the higher the quit probability, the higher the
outside wage. Furthermore, from the definition of q we see thatG
aq[w’(t),’v(t)]
dv(t)
= Ag[’w’(t) – v(t)] >0.
Higher outside wages imply that workers who are unhappy can leave more easily,
and as a result voluntary quits are higher.
Therefore, at a given level of training, the equilibrium wages and quit behavior
can be determined as the intersection of two upward sloping curves, hence the
multiplicity. Also, with higher quits profits due to training are lower because the
firm has a smaller ex post monopsony power over trained workers, and this leads
to less training in equilibrium.
Proposition 3. There exists an open set of parameter values such that W* is
strictly positive.
Proof See the Appendix,
This is perhaps the most interesting result of our paper. It emphasizes how our
model differs from the standard theory outlined in section 2.2. In the standard
theory, workers have to pay for their general training. Here, they get paid an
additional amount. Thus even if workers are not credit constrained, they will
not pay for their training. The underlying reason is naturally the firm’s ex-post
monopsony power over trained workers. Depending on the equilibrium beliefs,
post-training wages may be so low that workers require compensation ex ante,
that is W* >0.
Finally, a brief discussion of the efficiency issues is necessary. Since Vt’ G
TnP, t“ < t’, the training level is inefficiently low. This is due to the fact that
the firm cares only about its own profits when it,chooses the level of training (see
(2.3)), whereas higher training also increases the return to the workers, especially
to those who are laid off or choose to quit in the second period. When we allow
‘The same is true for dq/du, see the Appendix,
11firms to attract workers by offering a combination of training wages and training
levels in section 3, part, but not all, of this inefficiency will be avoided. Second,
it is natural to ask whether an equilibrium with higher level of training Pareto
dominates one with lower training. The answer is ambiguous (see the example
below). To see the intuition note that since t < t’, increasing the level of training
is in general beneficial. However, an equilibrium with higher training also has
lower quits, Therefore more workers who have received negative utility shocks
and who would be better off finding a new job are forced to stay in their old firm.
This means that the allocation of workers to jobs is more distorted. In general it
is not possible to ascertain which of these two forces will dominate.
2.3.3. An Example of Multiplicity y
In this subsection we give a parameterized example of multiple equilibria. We
first show how multiple wages and quit levels can arise as part of an equilibrium
at a given training level, and then show how this leads to multiple equilibrium
training levels.
Consider the following specific features. The distribution of the taste shock
G(.) is uniform over [0, 1]. Training takes only two values, t E {O, C}, where
C >0 is the cost of training. Also Q(O) = 1 and a(C) = a >1. Ability also has
only two values: with probability p, ~ = O and with probability 1 – p, q = 1.7
Suppose a firm decides to train. Then, profits with training t = C are given
by
7r(t=c) =(l-p)(w-’u)(a -w) –c (2.9)
Thus, all workers with q = O are laid off and the optimal wage offer to remaining
workers maximizes equation (2.9). This yields w = (a + v) /2. Wages for quitters
and laid off workers are given by
(1 -p)(l - W+v)a
‘=p+(l–p)(l–w+~)
Combining the expression for the wage w and (2.10) we get
(1 -p)v’ - 2[(1 -p)a - l]V+ (1 -p)a(a - 2) = o
(2.10)
7Note that in our main analysis we assumed F(q) to be continuously differentiable. This
was adopted for simplicity and our results hold with F(q) having atoms as is the case in this
example.
12which has two positive real roots as long as Q > 2 and (1 – p)pa < 1/2. Thus
for the same level of training of the workers, there can be two equilibrium levels
of wages w and v and quit behaviors. F~lrthermore, with lower wages for the
quitters, quits are lower and profits are higher and depending on the value of
training cost, C, we can also have multiple training equilibria.
Consider for instance p = 0.2, a = 3. If the firm trains, we get two wage
equilibria with
1. v = 2.00, W = 2.50, q = 0,50, n(t = C) = 0,20 – C
2. v = 1.50, W = 2.25, q = 0.25, n(t = C) = 0.45 – C
Furthermore, we can easily incorporate into this example a small group of workers
quitting their apprenticeship firms for exogenous and publicly observable reasons
(see section 4 for the relation of this to our empirical test). The wages of these
workers in both scenarios will be ~j~ = 2.4, the mean productivity of trained
workers. Thus, in both cases these workers earn more than voluntary quitters
and laid off workers, and in one of the equilibria they earn more and in the other
less than the stayers. However, on average they are always less able than stayers!
To develop the example further, if the training cost C = 0,3, then we also have
two equilibria with different training levels. In the first, scenario 1 is expected
and no workers are trained. In the second, scenario 2 is anticipated after the
apprenticeship, and firms knowing that they will be able to recoup all the cost of
training in the second-period, offer training to all the workers:
1. v = 0.78, W = 0.89, q = 0.89, t = O,W = 0.01
2. v = 1.50, W = 2.25, q = 0.25, t = C,W = 0.15
In both equilibria the “training wage” is positive, but it is actually higher when
training is positive . That is, in stark contrast to the Beckerian conventional
wisdom that predicts that workers should pay for their general training, here
workers are being paid an additional amount to take part in an apprenticeship.
This is because of the informational advantage of the incumbent firm which leads
to a low wage in period 2. Free entry ensures that the firm has to pay for this
profit opportunity at date 1.
Finally, it is easy to verify that with the parameter values we have chosen
all workers (before they know their q and 19)prefer to be in a high training/low
quit equilibrium rather than a low training/high quit equilibrium. However, if
13we change parameter values such that C = 0.1, then with or without high quits,
training will be an equilibrium. In this case, workers prefer the high quit equilib-
rium with less monopsony power for the firm since in this equilibrium they will
not be forced to stay in jobs to which they are not well-suited.
3. Extensions and Discussion
3.1. Raids on Trained Workers
So far we have only allowed outside firms to hire quitters which can be thought of
as passive poaching. The alternative is of course active poaching or raids whereby
a firm makes an offer to a currently employed worker. To analyze these possibil-
ities, we now add more structure to our model. As before, outside firms observe
the training level of workers employed by another firm, but observe neither this
worker’s ability q, nor his willingness to quit the current job, 8. Again 6’ in not
observed by the current employer either. A raider makes an offer vP(t) to all
workers with training level t at a certain apprenticeship firm. This offer specifies
the wage that the worker will receive if employed by the raider regardless of his
ability. We assume that this offer is observed by the apprenticeship firm who can
then make a counter offer which we denote by w~(t). At this point we truncate
the bidding war and the worker has to decide which of these offers to take.g
To obtain clean results, we distinguish two separate scenarios.
3.1.1. Scenario 1: Poaching offers at the end of period 1.
In this case, raiders have to make the offer without knowing which workers will
be laid off by the training firm. They will also expect the apprenticeship firm to
make a counter-offer. This will lead to an extreme form of winner’s curse. In the
case where ~ = O, the raider will only obtain a worker when its bid is above the
productivity of the worker. Using this idea, we can establish the following:
Lemma 1. If the poaching offer is made at the end of period 1, then vP(t) >
max Vn~ is not profitable where V“P is the set of equilibrium outside wage func-
tions without poaching.
8We conjecture that an ascending (English) auction between the outside firm and the ap-
prenticeship firm will not change the results in a substantial way, athough we have not formally
proved this.
14With the poaching offer at the end of period 1, the firm will get all workers
who would be otherwise laid off and some of the high productivity workers with
0>0. However, these are precisely the workers who would have chosen to quit
had the outside wage been vP(t). But then (2.8) determines which outside wage
functions break even. Thus, the raider never wants to make an offer above the
maximum equilibrium outside wage offer, i.e. an offer that violates (2.8).
As a consequence, while the possibility of raids does not make training impossi-
ble, it still discourages it. This result arises because raids destroy the multiplicity
of equilibria; in particular the equilibrium with low quits does not survive the
introduction of raids. To see this, suppose that without raids there were mul-
tiple equilibria such that a worker with training t’could receive either v (t’)or
i (t’) > v(t’). What maintains both of these outside wages as equilibria is that at
the lower wage, v (t’), few workers quit because they expect low wages and this
lowers the average quality of the workers in the second-period labor market. Yet,
if all these workers quit, the outside wage would be high, i (t’), and quitting would
be preferred. This implies that by offering ti(t’) the raider could induce all these
workers to quit, thus the equilibrium with lower training and higher outside wages
would always be selected.
As a consequence, it follows that:
Proposition 4. With poaching offers at the end of period 1, there exists a unique
equilibrium level of training. Let the set of equilibrium training levels without
poaching be T“P, and let the set of outside wage functions be V“P. Then the
equilibrium training level with poaching is tp = min Tn~ and the equilibrium
outside wage offer is VP(t) = max V“P.
Proof See the appendix.
3.1.2. Scenario 2: Poaching offers can be made at any time.
In this case the raider firm can wait for layoffs and then make a poaching offer
to the remaining trained workers. In the previous case the poaching offers were
“timid” since the raider was afraid of attracting the workers who would otherwise
be laid off. Now this is no longer true and raiders are willing to offer higher wages.
The game is now much more complicated and a full analysis is beyond the scope
of this paper. Here we can establish that our previous results do not change in
fundamental ways.
15The crucial assumption we make is that the number of workers each training
firm lays off is observable. Because the workers who are not laid off will be of
higher quality, quitters will want to wait for the more favorable poaching offer
rather than be pooled with the laid off workers. This implies that there is a
strategic element in the layoff decision of the training firm. By laying off fewer
workers, the training firm can induce raiders to make lower offers. To see this
consider the case where the training firm lays off half of its workers, then outside
firms will deduce that the remaining workers are all above average ability. On
the other hand, if the firm does not lay off many workers, then raiding firms will
recognize that they will also attract more of the lemons.
To formalize this intuition consider the following sequence of events. The
apprenticeship firm trains all workers, then offers a unique wage to all workers and
lays off some. These actions are perfectly observed by outsiders. Then outsiders
make raiding offers. The firm can respond to these raiding offers if it wishes.
Finally, the workers decide which of these offers to take.
In this case, an equilibrium will take the following form. The training firm
offers a zero wage to all of its workers and lays off none. This strategy has no cost
for the firm since it knows that in equilibrium there will definitely be raids and
thus it can get rid of the workers it does not want by not making counter-offers.g
Then equilibrium is characterized by a raiding offer VP(t) such that all raiding firms
make this offer and make zero profits. Then the firm optimally responds to vP(t)
by offering w~(t) = max{v,(t), w“(t)} to all workers that have q > WR(~)/~(~)
where w’(t) is as defined in section 2. To see why the apprenticeship firm’s best
response takes this simple form, note that if VP(t) < w*(t), then the maximization
problem of section 2 applies to the firm. In contrmt, if vP(t) > w*(t) and the
incumbent firm wants to keep the worker in question, it is forced to make a higher
offer. In this case, the lowest wage that would induce some workers to stay is
to match the offer of the raider. Therefore, we can determine the equilibrium
from the condition that the optimal vP(t) makes zero profits. The raider will lose
money on workers that have ability q < vP(t) /a(t) but will make positive profits
from workers who have O >0 and decide to leave despite the counter-offer of the
firm. Thus, the zero-profit condition implies that
[I- A[l- G(wR(~) - vp(~))ll ~
~R(t)/~(~)[a(t)q - vp(t)]~~(~)
+A[l– G(wR(t) – Vp(t))][Q(t)T – Vp(t)] = O
‘However, this strategy has costs if all of the potential raiders ‘tremble’. Thus we have not
shown that this equilibrium is Trembling Hand Perfect.
16NowsupposevP(t) <w*(t), then araider collldincrease itsofferand will not get
any more lemons, since it is already receiving all q < w~(t) /a (t), but will have
a higher probability of getting workers who have high productivity and 6>0 (a
formal proof would follow Lemma 1). Thus we can concentrate on outcomes that
have vP(t) = w~(t) 2 w“ (t). This is sufficient to prove the following result:
Proposition 5. With poaching offers made at any time, there exists a unique
equilibrium training level, t’ > 0. Denote the set of equilibrium training levels
without poaching by TnP and the set of equilibrium outside wage functions by
VnP, then the equilibrium training level with poaching, t“ < min TnP and the
equilibrium outside wage offer vp(t) ~ max VnP.
Proof See the appendix.
To reiterate, the basic idea is that the firm is still able to retain some of the
high ability workers, and given Assumption 1, this makes training worthwhile.
However, the more aggressive raids tend to reduce the level of training.
This analysis also illustrates that our model has quite rich predictions and
generates positive levels of training in different institutional settings. Moreover, it
suggests a crucial role for the organization of the labor market. In a market where
institutions make poaching more difficult (such as works councils in Germany
which enforce consistent rules in hiring and promotions), we predict that training
levels should be higher than in a labor market where raids are not restricted (e.g.
the U.S.).
3.1.3. Some Purther Issues
While we have addressed the issue of raids, there is another question that can be
posed. Workers who are of high ability but unhappy at their current job could
quit after the firm’s retention decision and thus signal to the market that they
were not actually laid off. This is not allowed in our model. It has to be noted
that our model is too simplistic in that learning is instantaneous and complete. A
more realistic but less transparent model would have abilities changing over time
and new information arriving constantly regarding the productivity of the worker.
In such a model with continuous learning, quits at any point in time cannot be
distinguished from layoffs immediately after the arrival of bad news. A model
with a continuous flow of information would also be more useful as the current
model has the extreme assumption that all relevant information about the worker
17is learned at the end of the first period and firms have no opportunity to fine tune
training to the workers’ needs and ability. Although with continuous learning the
firm can vary the amount of training it gives, such a model would still imply that
training will not be a one-to-one function of ability (otherwise the informational
advantage of the firm would completely disappear).
3.2. Equilibrium with Verifiable ~aining
The assumption we have used so far has been that the firm offers only a training
wage to attract workers and decides unilaterally about the training level. We now
allow firms to offer a contract [W, t] to attract workers to their training programs.
The optimal contract is found by maximizing the expected utility of a worker
subject to a zero-profit condition and the liquidity constraint of the worker. Thus
the problem reduces to
mwa; (1 – A)[l – F(fi*(t))]w*(t) + A[l – F(fi”(t))][l – G(w’(t) – w(t)) ]v(t)
+[~ + (1 - A)F(fi*(t))] ~W*(t)-”(t)[w*(t) - i3]dG(0) (3.1)
subject to
w = [1 – q[w”(t”), U(t’)]] J;t*l[a(t*)q – w*(t*)]dF(q) – t“
W>o (3.2)
where w*(t) and fi*(t) are determined through (2.4) and (2.5) by the maximization
of the firm and v(t) is determined by Bayes’ rule by the outside firms as described
by (2.8). The resulting allocation is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 6. Generically, there exists a unique equilibrium level of training
t*. This training level is such that t’ > t* > max Tn~, where Tn~ is the set of
equilibrium training levels of section 2.
Proof See the appendix,
When the level of training is verifiable, the multiplicity of equilibria disappears
even without raids. In addition, the amount of training is higher. The intuition
18for both results is related. First recall that with training unilaterally chosen by
the firm as in Section 2, each firm could believe that outside wages would be
high, thus ex post monopsony power limited, and it would want to offer little
training. Can we have the same hold in an equilibrium with verifiable training?
The answer is no. Since the zero-profit condition holds in the second-hand labor
market, workers will anticipate that in an equilibrium with high quits, they will
still benefit from high training. They will therefore be willing to assume some of
the cost of training by accepting a contract with a lower wage W. Thus, even when
it is believed that ex post monopsony power will be limited, offering high training
is profitable for firms because such a package will attract workers at, low starting
wages. This also explains why firms give more training now than in section 2.
The next question to ask is why this process does not, take us to the first-best.
The answer is instructive; even though the package specifies the training level, it
does not commit the firm to a firing and subsequent wage policy. This implies
that there will be some degree of adverse selection in the second-hand market, and
as a result some workers with low values of 6’ will prefer to stay in their training
firm, thus first-best will not be achieved. Moreover, as productivity and training
are complements, higher training levels imply that ex post quit decisions will be
more distorted, hence the equilibrium training level lower than t’.
3.3. Relation to the Literature
Our model is related to a number of papers in the literatures on training and on
wage determination in imperfect labor markets. Highlighting the differences will
further clarify our main points. The first strand of the literature is the competitive
models of training. These models start with the seminal work of Becker (1964)
and Mincer (1974). As we show in the second section, these models are unable to
generate general training in the absence of a significant firm-specific component in
the apprenticeship process unless workers pay for the training. Thus it is apparent
that the fundamental logic of our mechanism is rather different.
Regarding the German apprenticeship system, Oulton and Steedman (1994)
have conjectured that training wages simply reflect productivity, so that the gen-
eral human capital model explains the German case. This view is not widely
shared, since various studies by the German government and by the European
community have repeatedly found that large enterprises have significant net out-
lays during apprenticeship training (see Harhoff and Kane, 1994, and Soskice,
1994 for numbers and references). Training practitioners we have talked to, in-
19eluding union representatives, confirm the interpretation that training is costly to
firms. The question which remains, however, is whether firm-specific components
of training are important enough to explain the existence of substantial general
training as well. We therefore contrast our model to the specific human capital
case in the empirical analysis below, to investigate which explanation seems more
consistent with the evidence.
The second group of papers includes the studies of adverse selection and raids
in labor markets by Greenwald (1986), Waldman (1984), and Lazear (1986). While
Greenwald noted the link between the superior information of the firm and the
profitability of general training, our paper is the first to formalize this argument.
In fact, we show that such superior information will not, always lead to general
training but will do so when training and unobserved ability are complements.
Our model also goes beyond these previous treatments of the adverse selection
problem, in allowing raids, in endogenizing the quit decisions of workers, and in
deriving a possible multiplicity of equilibria. 10
Another paper that is related both theoretically and empirically is Gibbons
and Katz (1991 ). They too construct an asymmetric information model and test
the implications of this model using the wages of displaced workers and quitters.
The first difference is that Gibbons and Katz do not consider training, nor do they
analyze endogenous quits and raids. In addition, in contrast to theirs, our test,
described in more detail in the following subsection, involves a third group, so we
can draw a sharper distinction between an adverse selection model and models
with pure heterogeneity.
There are other mechanisms which lead to monopsony power of the firm with-
out deriving this from asymmetric information. In this case too, the monopsony
power of the firm would imply that it is willing to pay part of the general training
cost. This result is embedded in the more general model of Acemoglu (1995),
where the monopsony power arises from imperfect labor markets and wage bar-
gaining. Acemoglu’s paper focuses on the interactions of training and innovation
decisions, while the basic intuition can be traced back to Grout (1984). Acernoglu
(1995) also shares with this paper the emphasis in the quality composition of the
labor force in determining training (and innovation) decisions.
10Thereare a number of other papers that point out the possibility of multiple equilibria in
the presence of adverse selection. See, for instance, Chang and Wang (1994), Abe (1994), and
Pendergrast (1992). None of these papers deal with the case of general training that is observed
by all parties (a realistic assumption especially for the German system), nor do they analyze
how the result of multiplicity is affected by other features of the model, including the contractual
structure and the possibility of raids.
204. Deriving Testable Implications and Empirical Strategy
We now draw implications from the model which we will test below with data
from Germany. We also contr=t the implications of our theory to a specific
human capital model. There are three main reasons why apprentices leave their
firm in Germany: (i) their employer does not offer a permanent contract after the
apprenticeship, (ii) workers quit voluntarily to find other employment; (iii) men
are drafted to do military service. We assume that firms are unable to distinguish
between voluntary quits and layoffs, but can see if a worker comes back from
military service. The fact that there is another group of workers which separates
for military service does not change any of our theoretical analysis. In our data
we can distinguish workers who stayed with their training firm initially, those who
left for military service and then work for a different employer, and workers who
leave for other reasons. We do not know whether workers who stay with their
apprenticeship firm served in the military. The model implies the following:
1.
2.
Stayers earn more than laid off workers and voluntary quitters. That is
w*(t) > v(t). It is easy to see that this has to be true. If w*(t) < v(t),
stayers would quit even if they did not receive a negative taste shock and
be better off in the second-hand market.
Military quitters leaving for largely exogenous reasons earn more than other
quitters. That is IJn(t) > v(t). The reason they earn more than quitters
is that they are of higher average ability and both groups are paid their
average marginal product in the second-hand market. For this to be true
it is not necessary that there is no selection at all among military quitters.
For example, training firms may want to rehire very high ability military
quitters after they complete their service. If there is some cost to doing so
—for instance, in the case that firms need to keep certain positions open for
these workers—, training firms will be more selective in retaining workers
who have to do military service than other workers. Denote the ability cut
off for military quitters used by the training firm in equilibrium as fin(t),
then the average quality of the pool of military quitters in the second-hand
market is
q[w*(t), V(t)] o!(t)fi + [1– q[w’(t), v(t)]]J:m(’) a(t)qdF(q)
q[w”(t), ‘u(t)] + [1 – q(w”(t), v(t)] ]F(qm(t))
>
q[w*(t), ?)(t) ]a(t)q + [1 – q[w*(t), w(t)]] fj*(’) a(t)qdF(q)
q[w*(t), v(t)]+ [1 – q(w”(t), v(t)] ]F(fi*(t))
21where the inequality follows from fin (t) > fi”(t).
3. Military quitters may earn more or less than stayers, v~(t) >< w*(t). The
reason for this is that military quitters are freed from the adverse selection
problem (at least to some degree). If the monopsony power of the training
firm over stayers is large enough compared to the quality of the pool of
military quitters, the equilibrium wage for stayers may be below the wage
of workers separated for an exogenous reason (see for instance the numerical
example in section 2.3.3).
4. A specific human capital model which could also generate training paid for
by firms will imply v~(t) < w*(t) because military quitters loose their spe-
cific human capital. Since our data are cross sectional with retrospective
information on a worker’s apprenticeship firm, many stayers have also sepa-
rated from their training firm by the time of the survey. We therefore control
for whether a worker is still with his apprenticeship firm when we observe
earnings. While this has no bearing on the ranking of earnings among the
three groups for our model, the specific human capital model implies
E(v(t) I separated from training firm)
= E(v~(t) Iseparated from training firm)
= E(w(t) Iseparated from training firm)
Our empirical strategy to test these implications is therefore to run a wage re-
gression controlling for worker characteristics at the time the apprenticeship starts
(e.g. information on schooling and on the type of apprenticeship firm). Dummy
variables for stayers and military quitters let us discern the wage differentials for
these two groups relative to other quitters.
5. The Data
We use data from two cross-sections of the German “Qualification and Career
Survey”ll conducted in 1979 and in 1985/86. Both surveys sample approximately
30,000 employed workers of German nationality in the age group 15 to 65. Besides
llQualifikation und Berufsverlauf, conducted by the German Federal Institute for Vocational
Training (Bundesinstitut fiir Berufsbildung) and the Institute for Labor Nlarket Research (In-
stitut fiir Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung),
22standard questions on demographics and the current job, the surveys contain rich
information on job attributes and job content, the qualifications needed for the job
and how they were obtained, and retrospective questions on a worker’s career path,
education, and training history. In particular, the survey contains information on
the apprenticeship firm of a worker, and whether and why a respondent separated
from that firm.
We restrict the samples we use to workers who went through an apprenticeship
and did not obtain any higher school based education. Additional education after
the apprenticeship would introduce another group of quitters which is not easily
integrated into our model. To make sure that we look at a population which is
likely to have completed both their apprenticeship and their military service we
limit the sample to those between age 23 and 59. We only consider men working
full time because women have very different career patterns and they often train
for very different occupations than men. About 99 percent of men with the other
sample characteristics work full time in Germany. We also eliminate workers
whose apprenticeship was in the public sector or who work currently in the public
sector or in the construction industry. Retention rules after the apprenticeship and
pay determination in the public sector are likely to be governed by rules different
from the private sector. The construction industry is the only sector in Germany
were training is not financed voluntarily by firms. Instead, a levy is imposed
on those firms who do not train apprentices and redistributed to those who do.
This indicates that turnover in the construction industry maybe sufficiently high
that the mechanism we discuss in this paper does not support training by firms.
Furthermore, we restrict the sample to those who left secondary school in 1948
or later. Most military quitters in the earlier period served in World War II,
which may introduce survivorship or other biases. In addition, the environment in
which firms operated before the war might have been different, since the industrial
apprenticeship system had developed only since the turn of the century.
The earnings variable on the surveys is the gross monthly wage. Respondents
in the 1979 survey were asked to report their earnings in 13 brackets and in the
1985/86 survey in 22 brackets. We assign each individual earnings equal to the
bracket midpoint. 12 Because of the large number of brackets this is unlikely to
introduce much more measurement error than is done by respondents’ rounding
12The top bracket in 1979 was DM 5,000 or more which we assigned a value of DM 7,500 (2.9
percent of all sample respondents are in this bracket), in 1985/86 it was DM 15,000 or more
which we assigned a value of DM 17,500 (0.6 percent of sample respondents). The results are
not sensitive to the value resigned to the top bracket.
23continuous amounts. We then convert the variable to an hourly wage by dividing
by the number of weekly hours. We construct the standard variable for potential
experience as age - schooling - 5. The number of years of schooling are derived
from the survey information on the types of schools attended and degrees obtained
following Krueger and Pischke (1995).
Our key variables of interest are related to the separation from the training
firm after the apprenticeship. The survey asks when respondents left their training
firm, and the reason for the separation. We only focus on separations immediately
after the apprenticeship. Apprenticeship contracts in Germany are generally fixed
term, and a new contract has to be written for further employment. Typically,
a training firm will make employment offers to most of its apprentices but it is
under no legal obligation to do so. As reasons for a separation, the 1979 survey
allowed six responses: left for military service, laid off or quit, could obtain a
higher income elsewhere, better working conditions elsewhere, obtained additional
training or education, and other. Multiple responses were allowed. In 1985 only
three mutually exclusive answers were possible: military conscription, laid off by
the firm, or quit voluntarily. We create two dummy variables from these questions.
The variable stayers is used for those who stayed with their apprenticeship firm
after the end of the apprenticeship, although these workers may have left the firm
by the time of the survey. The variable mi~ita~ quitters is one for those who left
their apprenticeship firm immediately and mention military service as the reason
(even if other categories are also mentioned in the 1979 survey). The variable also
includes conscientious objectors leaving for a non-military service.
We will think of the military quitters as separated from their firms due to
exogenous reasons and we also assume that firms taking part in the secondary
labor market for trained workers will realize this. Since this is our key identifying
assumption, the possibility of systematic selection into the military deserves some
discussion. Military service has been mandatory for all able bodied German males
since 1957, but the fraction of a cohort actually drafted has varied over time. The
military conducts a physical exam, but no other tests to determine draft eligibil-
ity. There are also other temporary exemptions, mainly to allow young men to
complete an education in process. This will typically not apply to youths leaving
school at age 15 or 16 beyond the time when they complete an apprenticeship
of three years. Since the 1960s, about 60 to 75 percent of a cohort have served
(Ullrich, 1984). The pure mechanics of the draft system in Germany severely limit
the military’s ability to select draftees.
In order to assess whether our results may be biased due to selection into
24or experience from military service we also use data from the first wave of the
German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP). This dataset has retrospective questions
on the employment history of all workers from age 16. In particular, we know
whether any respondent served in the military at any particular year of their life.
Using these retrospective data we construct a dummy variable for everybody who
ever served. We select a sample analogous to the Qualification and Career Surveys.
However, unlike the samples from the Qualification and Career Surveys, the SOEP
sample includes respondents who might have returned to higher education after
the apprenticeship and those who did their apprenticeship in the public sector but
work in the private sector at the time of the 1984 survey. These exclusions are
not possible in the SOEP. The sample includes 526 observations.
6. Empirical Results
6.1. Summary Statistics
Table 1 gives summary statistics for the two data sets, for the full samples as
well as for stayers and military quitters separately. Most apprentices leave sec-
ondary school after 9th or 10th grade, only few obtain additional schooling before
the apprenticeship although the incidence of higher schooling increases over time.
Military quitters are more likely to have a tenth grade education. This may re-
sult from the fact that many teenagers leaving school after grade 9 may not have
reached draft age (18) when they complete their apprenticeship. We therefore
control for this difference in schooling in the regressions below. Slightly less than
10 percent of sample members go on to obtain a qualification as master crafts-
men. This entails refining the skills in their trade, and allows them to set up
their own crafts shop and to train apprentices themselves. Military quitters are
younger because significant numbers of young men were drafted starting only in
the 1960s. We constructed two measures of work related disabilities. Severe dis-
abilities refer to an officially recognized disability rated at 50 percent or more
of a regular worker’s capacity. Any other reported disability is classified as less
severe. Military quitters tend to be more able bodied, since the military screens
on health, but the differences are slight.
About 80 percent of apprentices stay in their apprenticeship firm initially al-
though only 25 to 30 percent remain there by the time of the survey. 13 The
13The 1979 survey failed to allow for an
the classification of who is still working in
exhaustive set of answers to this question so that
their apprenticeship firm may be error ridden. It
25fraction of workers still in their apprenticeship firm is slightly higher among stay-
ers, but not dramatically so. Military quitters make up only 3 to 5 percent of
the sample, much fewer than the fraction of young men in Germany who served
when the military draft was in place after 1957. This presumably reflects the fact
that many workers stay with their firm after their apprenticeship and only then
interrupt their career for military service or return to their previous employer even
after military service. This does not invalidate our test, as discussed in section 4.
Nevertheless, as figures 1 and 2 show, the fraction of military quitters varies over
time (i.e. by graduation year from the apprenticeship) in the f~hion expected
from aggregate draft rates. The fraction of military quitters increases from the
mid- 1950s and stabilizes around the mid- 1960s. Note, however, that the estimates
in these figures are rather noisy due to the small cell sizes.
A large fraction of apprenticeships takes place in the crafts sector and in
smaller firms, although manufacturing is also a large provider of training. hlany
apprentices move out of the crafts sector; while it trains more than 40 percent of
our samples, it only employs a little more than 20 percent. Most of the movement
is into services and other industries. This category include professions such as
lawyers, accountants, and physicians, who train paralegals, and accounting and
physician’s aides. The distribution across job types is rather similar across groups.
About 20 percent in 1979 and 15 percent in 1985/86 of apprenticeship trained em-
ployees work in relatively unskilled blue or white collar positions. 7 percent of the
1979 sample reports reaching an executive position compared with only 1 percent
in 1985/86. The relevant question in the later survey was more precise in stat-
ing that this group only refers to employees with extensive managerial discretion.
Military quitters report that they use slightly less of their apprenticeship skill
although even this difference practically vanishes in the later survey. More than
65 percent of workers use their apprenticeship skills “much” or “a lot .“
6.2. Basic Results
Stayers and military quitters differ in many observable dimensions, including some
that were clearly discernible at the beginning of the apprenticeship. Since there is
likely to be a good deal of selection into better and worse apprenticeships among
school leavers (Soskice, 1994, argues that this is the case), it is important to control
allows responses for those who left within the first five years after their apprenticeship and those
who stayed but no category for those who left after five years is allowed. Item nonresponse is
no higher than in the 1985/86 survey so that the members of the missing category must be
distributed in the remaining cells.
26for these observable attributes in our wage regressions. On the other hand, we
do not want to control for any attributes of the jobs workers obtained after their
apprenticeship since these will be related to worker ability and selection, which is
part of the outcome we are interested in. We therefore present wage regressions
in table 2, which include the number of years of primary and secondary school, a
quartic in potential experience, the sector of the apprenticeship firm, two dummies
for disability status, and a dummy for workers who are still in their apprenticeship
firm. The last variable is the only one which potentially contains information on
post-apprenticeship outcomes. It turns out to be relatively unimportant and we
also present results without this variable.
Our main result is that both stayers and military quitters earn higher wages
than those who left their apprenticeship firm for other reasons. Only the coeffi-
cient for stayers is significant in the 1985/86 regressions, while the others are not.
Nevertheless, the consistency of the pattern across surveys makes it more likely
that the results are not merely the product of sampling variability. In fact, re-
stricting the coefficients on the two dummies to be the same across surveys yields
a value of 0.038 with a standard error of 0.018 for military quitters and 0.032 for
stayers (standard error 0.0 12). Both are significantly different from zero below
the 2 percent level, The fact that military quitters may actually earn more than
stayers is in support of one of our key predictions. Recall that, military quitters
have higher ability than other quitters but lower ability than stayers. However,
once they separate military quitters can obtain their marginal product while the
incumbent firm extracts rents from the stayers. If these rents are large enough,
they may outweigh the quality advantage of the stayer group (see the numerical
example above). Thus, the test of whether military quitters earn higher or as high
wages as stayers is a challenging test of our predictions. 14
An alternative interpretation of our results would be that the military posi-
tively selects draftees. We argued already above that we find it unlikely that such
selection is important since the military only screens on health. Our controls for
work related disabilities should pick up differences in health status of veterans
and other workers. Another possibility is that military service imparts skills or
attitudes which are valued in the civilian labor market. Again, we find this un-
14Notice however, that stayers will mostly have obtained other jobs by the time of the survey
(and we co’ntrol separately for still being in the apprenticeship firm), so that these rents do not
accrue to the apprenticeship firm anymore. The adverse selection mechanism which drives our
model of training is likely to continue to be important later on in workers’ careers. This is true
in particular if ability evolves over time and more information accrues to the incumbent firm.
27likely to be the case for skilled workers in Germany. Imbens and van der Klaallw
(1995) find that mandatory military service in the Netherlands lowers earnings by
about 5 percent for those who served, which implies veterans lose approximately
the returns to experience during the time of service. This suggests that there
is little evidence of military service raising earnings in civilian jobs, for example
through training.
To provide more direct evidence on this question we ran a wage regression for
a similar sample of men from the 1984 wave of the Socioeconomic Panel. This
dataset allows us to include a dummy variable for everybody who ever served
in the military 15. If draftees are positively selected or if military experience is
valuable in the civilian labor market then military service should be associated
with a positive wage differential. Instead we find that service actually leads to
slightly lower earnings, although this effect is not, significant. This indicates that
our findings for military quitters are very unlikely to be due to selection or training
in the military, thus leaving our explanation as the likeliest candidate.
6.3. Robustness Checks
We investigate the robustness of our results next and extend our findings in some
other directions. Table 3 reports the coefficients on the stayer and military quitter
dummies for a number of different samples and specifications, making modifica-
tions to the baseline one at a time. The 1979 survey allows us to control for
secondary school grades in math and German. This lowers the relevant coef-
ficients slightly. Dropping the dummy variable indicating whether a worker is
still with his apprenticeship firm leads to slightly lower coefficients on the stayer
variable.
The same is true when we eliminate self-employed from the sample, a group
whose income is typically less accurately reported. We also investigate the effect
of excluding those with 12 or 13 years of education. This group often goes on
to additional schooling after the apprenticeship. We have eliminated anybody
who obtains further academic credentials from our sample already, because this
introduces an additional group of quitters after the apprenticeship which does not
easily fit in our simple model. This may leave a curious selection of 12th and 13th
graders who remain in the sample. Again the coefficients are slightly lower when
this group is dropped.
15This dataset does not allow us to construct some of the other controls about the type of
apprenticeship because such data are not collected on the survey.
28To ensure that our military quitter dummy does not pickup any nonlinearities
in age or experience not already controlled for, we limit the sample to those
who were born after 1938. These are the cohorts at risk of being drafted for
military service. In addition, instead of controlling for a quartic in experience,
we put in separate dummies for each age of the respondents in the sample. The
coefficient on the military quitter dummy is slightly higher. The next row takes
the opposite step and drops the sample restriction that respondents finished school
after 1948. This adds more observations particularly to the 1979 survey, many of
whom completed their apprenticeship during the 1930s and 40s. This increases
the diversity of military quitters by including World War II veterans. It turns
out that this inclusion lowers the coefficients on the military quitter dummy by
about 4 log points in the 1979 survey. There is no change in the later data set.
The most dramatic and inconsistent change occurs when we limit the sample to
apprenticeships in the manufacturing industry. This is the sector where training
is of the highest quality and the net costs borne by the firms are the largest.
In fact, in table 2 we found an 8 to 10 percent wage differential for training in
manufacturing over the crafts sector. Thus, we might expect to find the most
pronounced support for our model when we limit the sample to manufacturing.
Instead, the stayer coefficient goes to zero in the 1979 sample, and the military
quitter coefficient does the same in the later data. However, we are eliminating two
thirds of the sample with this restriction and standard errors more than double
so that these results may simply not be very reliable.
In summary, the results in tables 2 and 3 confirm the predictions of our model.
Workers who stay with their firm after the apprenticeship earn higher wages than
those who quit or are laid off. Military quitters also earn higher wages than other
quitters because they are separated from their firm for an exogenous reason and
should therefore be of higher quality than other quitters. In fact, there earnings
are as high or higher as those of stayers.
6.4. Can There be Alternative Interpretations?
It is important to point out that these results are not easily reconciled with al-
ternative explanations. One objection might be that there are ability differences
between stayers, quitters, and military quitters because of selection, but these
differences are observable to everyone. Notice, however, that this explanation
suggests that military quitters should earn strictly less than stayers, who are the
most able group.
29A simpler model of training might be based on specific human capital. If a
large enough part of apprenticeship skills is firm-specific, the training firm may
be able to recoup its investment even in the general human capital component
of the apprenticeship. We include a dummy for everybody still with their ap-
prenticeship firm in the wage regressions in table 2. In a specific human capital
model, the coefficient on this variable should be positive. On the other hand, the
model says nothing about the earnings of leavers depending on the timing of the
separation. Thus, we would expect zero coefficients on the stayer and military
quitter dummies. The empirical results show exactly the opposite pattern.
An additional piece of evidence for our interpretation of the data is provided by
Pischke’s (1994) analysis of further training in Germany. He finds that the returns
to such training are basically zero. This result does not differ much between
workers who stay with the firm which provided the training and workers who
leave the training firm. In terms of the point estimates, the returns for stayers
are even slightly negative. This indicates that higher wages for stayers after firm
sponsored training are unique to apprenticeship training. This is, of course, the
period when the adverse selection problem is most severe because there is very
little information about worker abilities which is observable to outsiders.
6.5. Additional Evidence
Our model gives a clear ranking of the relative abilities of the three groups. Stay-
ers should be the most able, military quitters ought to fall in the middle, and
other quitters should have the lowest ability. Therefore, a variable related to abil-
ity would let us assess this prediction. Such a measure should not be publicly
observable before apprenticeship training takes place, because the quality and
extent of training itself may depend on the observed ability of secondary school
leavers as they get sorted into different firms.
Entorf, Gollac, and Kramarz (1995) argue that computers are used by more
able workers. Table 4 reports results from linear probability models for using a
computer on the job on the same controls as in table 2. Stayers are significantly
more likely to use computers in the 1985/86 survey while the incidence of computer
use is the same among military quitters and other quitters.
Another variable possibly correlated with ability is promotion. The clearest
indication of advancement is the position of a shop floor supervisor among blue
collar worker. This position is usually associated with further training and often
implies that the worker may be training apprentices himself. Stayers are more
30likely to reach this position while the effect is negative for military quitters. We
present results both for the full sample used previously and for blue-collar workers
only since shop floor supervisors are classified as blue collar. The results are
slightly more favorable in the restricted sample.
Traditionally, the position of shop floor supervisor was associated with master
craftsman training but this may be less the case in large manufacturing firms where
little is gained from this formal qualification. Nevertheless, master craftsmen
training may also be an indicator of ability. Among blue collar workers both
stayers and military quitters are more likely to undertake such training than
other quitters in 1979 and the opposite is true in 1985/86. The effects are always
stronger for military quitters.
Overall, the evidence on computer use, promotion to shop floor supervisor,
and master craftsmen training seems to indicate that stayers are of higher ability
than military quitters which supports our hypothesis that military quitters earn
wages which are higher than (or as high m) stayers because they are spared of
the monopsony power of their apprenticeship firms. On the other hand, military
quitters do not seem to differ much from other quitters which is not in line with
our predictions. However, it should be borne in mind that the group of military
quitters is small, so the results for this group are estimated very imprecisely.
7. Conclusion
This paper has presented a new theory of training. We believe this model has
some attractive features relative to the standard Beckerian theory as it predicts
that workers should not pay for their general training. We also argued that this
theory fits the institutional structure of the German labor market, and thus it has
particular relevance to Germany. Our model also sheds light on the very different
patterns of training observed in Germany and the U.S. Despite the highly stylized
nature of the model, we can make the following simple observations.
1. In terms of our model, we can think of the U.S. at a low training and high
quit equilibrium and Germany at a low quit, high training equilibrium. The
informal claim made by Blinder and Krueger (1991) that turnover should
be negatively related to the level of training is formalized in our proposition
2. Importantly, both turnover and training are endogenous in our model.
2. The institutional differences, especially the role of works councils in Ger-





(see for example Abraham and Houseman, 1993). This suggests that Ger-
many should have more training than the U.S. as formalized in propositions
4 and 5.
Information regarding the ability of the worker may be more important in
Germany than the U.S. because of high firing costs at the later stages of
a worker’s career (i.e. after the apprenticeship). Since a firm can easily
lay off its workers in the U.S., the cost of hiring a low quality worker is
not enormous and thus adverse selection can be less of a problem. This
observation also helps in thinking about the institutional differences between
the labor markets of the U.S. and Germany in endogenous terms. High
firing costs in Germany combined with the training system and the low quit
equilibrium may not be too distortionary, while the same level of firing costs
in the U.S. without any other changes in the labor market may be more
damaging. This may help explain the good performance of the German
economy during the post-war period despite the fact that the high degree
of labor market regulation might have hampered the optimal allocation of
resources.
Given the lower ability of firms to exploit internal training opportunities, our
model also suggests that school based training financed by workers them-
selves should be more important in the U.S. This is true even if vocational
schools are not as cost-effective as the apprenticeship programs of German
firms.
When adverse selection in the labor market is important, this can explain
firm sponsored training at all stages of a worker’s career. Pischke (1994)
reports evidence that further training in Germany does not lead to higher
wages. This is true even though this training seems to be general: many
workers reported receiving a written certificate which they would present
when applying for a new job. Workers who received further training also
report that it enables them to do their jobs better, so the training is pro-
ductive. If similar levels of further training are given to workers of different
abilities, adverse selection will prevent that the workers can capitalize on
their additional skills in the market. This may explain why the incidence of
further in-house training is higher in Germany than in the U.S.
Any explanation for training financed by firms will have to rely
imperfection in the labor market. If labor markets are imperfect,
32
on some
compar-isons of the U.S. and German training systems which rely on wages to make
inferences about productivity might be misleading. For instance, Harhoff
and Kane (1994) and borrowing from them, Heckman (1994), point out that,
there may be no market failure preventing training in the U.S. since wages
grow at the same rate over the lifecycle in the two countries. In the model
of this paper compensation is front loaded. Front loading is more extreme in
equilibria with more monopsony power and thus with more training. There-
fore, similar wage profiles in the U.S. and Germany are easily consistent
with more human capital accumulation in Germany.
7. Our model is also consistent with the historical evolution of the appren-
ticeship system in Germany. From the middle ages till the 19th century
apprentices paid a fee ( “Lehrgeld” ) to their training firm. At this time, ap-
prentices would typically choose self-employment after training in becoming
journeymen or setting up their own crafts shop. Thus, adverse selection
problems in hiring were unimportant. This changed when large enterprises
started training and hiring skilled workers at the beginning of this century.
By the time of World War II, positive training wages had replaced the fees
paid by apprentices.
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368. Appendix: Proofs of Propositions and Lemmata
Proposition 1: (i) First ignore t“ and W* and look at the determination of
the three equilibrium functions w(t), v(t) and fi(t) through the system defined
by (2.4), (2.5) and (2.8). Note that v(t) is determined in equilibrium from (2.8)
and w(t) and fi(t) are determined by maximizing (2,3). Also note that as t -
~,a’ (t) ~ O, throughout, we can restrict attention to a closed and bounded space
whereby w(t) and w(t) lie in [0, a(t)qmax] and fi(t) lies in [0, qmax]. Finally, to start
with suppose that w(t) is differentiable. Then, (2.3) is straightforwardly seen to
be differentiable. Thus if there is a unique optimizer w(t) and fi(t) for every t,
then w(t) and fi(t) as functions would be continuous and differentiable.
To check the uniqueness of the w(t) and fi(t), we need to study the concavity
of (2.3). We first substitute for fi(t) = w(t) /a(t) and obtain the profit, function of
an apprenticeship firm as:
In~H = [1 – q[w(t), v(t)]] /:[a(t)q – w(t)] dF(q)
a(t)
To ensure the uniqueness of the function w (t) it is sufficient to have log H concave. 16
Therefore we need to check that
logrI = log[l – q[w(t), v(t)]] + log)m [a(t)q – w(t)] dF(q)
*
is concave. Now note that q[w(t), v(t)] = 1 — ~ + AG[w(t) — v(t)] and therefore
log-concavity of G ensures that log(l – q) is concave. Next, Assumption 3, that
JZqd~(q) is log-concave ensures that the second term is concave. Thus the second
order conditions for a maximum are satisfied whenever the first-order conditions
hold. Hence w(t) and fi(t) are unique. Thus we have w(t) = ~(v(t)) where O is
a continuous and differentiable operator. Therefore, to establish the existence of
equilibrium is to show that the following functional equation has a fixed point:
lfiNote that if log H(z) is concave then ~ – ~ H(z) H(z)2 and if we are evaluating this at a
stationary point, H’(r) = O, then the second term disappears.
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v(t) = P[v(t), t] =
q[n(v(t)), w(t)] Q!(t)q + [1– q[n(v(t)), v(t)]]Jo Q!(t)qdF(q)
q[o(v(t)), v(t)] + [1 – q(Q(v(t)), ‘u(t)]]F (w)
(8.1)
To establish the existence of a fixed point to (8.1), we will make use of
Schauder’s Fixed Point Theorem (see Stokey and Lucas, 1989 or Bers, 1957).
To do this we need to show that
1. P maps from a closed and bounded subspace of V c C[X] into V itself
where X is a metric space over which the functions v are defined.
2. P is a continuous operator over V.
3. The family P[v (t), t] is equicontinuous for every v E V. (Or alternatively
that V is a compact and convex Banach Space with the chosen topology).




First take V c CIO, ~a(~]. Clearly, no wage greater than ~a(~ will paid to a
second-hand worker and also no wage less than O. Second, limit, attention to
the set of functions that are differentiable with bounded derivative (i.e. those
that satisfy a Lipschitz condition). This subspace is closed and bounded.
Moreover, since P is continuous and differentiable with a bounded derivative
(continuity and differentiability will be shown next, that P has bounded
derivative, it suffices to look at dP/dv), it maps V into V itself, that is
P[v(t), t] will also satisfy a Lipschitz condition.
It is sufficient to show that P is differentiable. This follows as v(.), Q(.),
a(t) are all smooth and [0, fia (~] is closed and bounded.
Take t and s such that Is – tl <6, we will show that there exists c >0 such
that [P[v(s), s] – P[v(t), tl < ~ for all v E V. Thus, we need to show that:
%
9[Q(~(s)),~(s)l~ (~)n+[l–~[Q(~(s) )7~(s)ll fo a(s)qdF(q)
q[Q(v(s)),v(s)] +[l–q(Q(v(s)),v( s)]]F(%) –
w
9[Q(u(t)),~(~)la( t)fi+[l-~[Q(~(~)) l~(t)ll Jo a(t)qdF(q)
q[Q(u(t)),v(t)] +[l–q(Q(w(t)),w(t) ]]F(*)
38Now denote the numerator by Nv(.) and the denominator by D.(. ) as conditioned
on the function v, then the problem can be written as
NV(S) Nv(t) — ——
Dv(s) DV(t) ‘e
Since v,O and a are all continuous and defined over a compact set [the set




DV(S) D.(t) < ‘v
Now since all v < V have bounded derivatives, there exists z > c. for all v E V,
thus let c = Z, Thus the family P[v (t), t] is equicontinuous and a fixed-point
exists. Since V is the space of differentiable functions, the equilibrium functions
~(t), n(t) and v(t) are differentiable.
Given differentiability, it then follows that t* that maximizes (2.6) and W*
that satisfies (2.7) can be found. QED
(ii) Now we establish some properties of the equilibrium. Suppose t* = O is a
solution. This implies q [w* (t”), v (t*)] = 1 from Assumption 1 and (2.6), but this
contradicts (2.5). Thus t“ > 0. Next suppose t* = tc.Then q[w”(t’), v(L*)] = O
and ~“ = O from (2.2) and (2.6), but then from (2.4), w* = O and all r3> 0 would
leave, thus q >0, a contradiction. Hence t* < tc,QED
Proposition 2: (i) The argument in the text establishes that the equilibrium
quits and wages are given by the intersection of two upward-sloping schedules for
a given t. Both are continuous by Assumption 2 and Proposition 1. Since g(.)
is unrestricted, we can always obtain multiple equilibria. Once we have multiple
equilibria for a given training level t, then from (2.6) we can get the equilibrium
levels oft.
(ii) First we show that vu > v’ is equivalent to q’ > q’. Consider the first-
order conditions of the maximization problem. Differentiating the definition of q
we can see that
where dv denotes a small change in v at given t. Next note that ~q/dv =
g(w(t) – v(t)) and dq/~w* = –g(w(t) – v(t)). dq/dw* can be obtained by totally
differentiating (2.5), This gives
39dw* ~g(.)(1 – F(fi)) – Ag’(.) Jfi[aq – w]dF(q)
x– 2Ag(.)(1 – F(fi)) – Ag’(.) ffi[aq – w]dF(q) + ~ [1– A (1 – G(.)) + }g(.)] f(fi)
where g(. ) stands for g (w — v) and similarly for G(. ) and g’(.). Assumptions
2 and 3 ensure that both the numerator and the denominator are positive but
the denominator is larger; thus O < dw*/dv < 1, which implies that dq/dv >0
everywhere. Equivalence of q“ > qb and t“ < tbfollows from (2.5). QED
Proposition 3: Take a sequence of distribution functions G. that converge
to G~ in the sup norm where G~ is dirac at O. Let Wn be the sequence of training
wages corresponding to the equilibrium with distribution fllnction Gn. Then it
is immediate that W~ > 0, since when G~ is degenerate w* = fi = v = q = O.
Then 3 n* : Vn > n“, W. >0. QED.
Lemma 1: All v(t) l V“P must be definition satisfy equation (2.8). Consider
Vg(t) = max V”P. Since this is the extremal equilibrium it is clear that if we
increase v(t) for a given t, the RHS of (2.8) will increase more than the LHS.
Now, an outside wage function vp(t) > w’(t),then all workers who would have
quit or been laid-off would accept this offer. Therefore the per worker revenue of
the firm is given by the RHS of (2.8) and thus this firm makes negative profits.
Therefore, vp(t) < max V“P.QED
Proposition 4: Lemma 1 establishes that VP(t) E V“P, Now suppose that
t~p(t) < max VnP. This cannot be an equilibrium, because an outside firm can
offer the wage function i(t) = max Vn~ – ~ to quitters, for ~ small enough more
workers who are retained but unhappy would quit and the outside firm would
make a positive profit. Thus a contradiction. QED
Proposition 5: From the argument in the text we can see that in equilibrium
all workers with O >0 will leave. Then the payoff of the training firm is
[1 -A] J:[a(t)q -
a
This expression cannot be at its maximum
t’ >0. Next we show that
w~(t)]dF(q)
for t = O given Assumption 1, thus
- q] ~W a’(t) qd~(q)
40By reducing w* on the RHS of this equation we obtain the LHS (as w* -0, we
get q + A and O - O). Thus to demonstrate that the RHS is larger than the
LHS, we need to show that the derivative of (2.6) with respect to w* is positive.
However, (2.6) is the derivative of (2.3), thus
d(2.6) 8(2.5) ~q ~
— =— =.—
dw” at I dw” ?j
a’(t) qdF(q) >0.
Now obviously
[1-A] ]:[a’(t)q - w~(t)]dF(q) < [1-A] /w a!’(t) qdF(q)
. 0
and thus the result that t“ < min T“~ follows. QED
Proposition 6: When firms offer a package [t, W] to attract trainees, the
problem reduces to maximizing the utility of the workers subject to a zero profit
condition, (3. 1) and (3.2). Next, given that the contract does not specify the
layoff and second-period wages functions, the firm will always choose fi >0, thus
t)(t) will always be less than what the workers receive in the training firm, w“ (t),
thus the greater is t, the more distorted is the quit decision. Thus t* < t’, Since
the equilibrium is now given as a result of a maximization problem rather than a
fixed point, the equilibrium must assign a unique maximum value W to workers.
Given the twice differentiability of the objective function, generic uniqueness of
t“ follows, QED
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Summary Statistics
I 1979 Survey I 1985186 Survey
Variable all stayers military all stayers military
quitters quitters
Schooling: 9 years 0.75 0.75 0.57 0.69 0.69 0.62
10 years 0.22 0.22 0,39 0.25 0.26 0.34
12 years 0.01 0.01 0,02 0.03 0,02 0.03
13 years 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.00
Training as master craftsman 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.08 0,05
German grade: 1 (lowest) 0,02 0.02 0.03 --- --- ---
2 0.11 0.11 0.15 --- --- ---
3 0,47 0.47 0.39 --- --- ---
4 0.34 0.34 0.39 --- --- ---
5 (highest) 0.06 0.06 0.04 --- --- ---
Math grade: 1 (lowest) 0.02 0,01 0.02 --- --- ---
2 0.07 0.06 0.07 --- --- ---
3 0.33 0.33 0.36 --- --- ---
4 0.45 0.46 0.41 --- --- ---
5 (highest) 0.13 0.14 0.14 --- --- ---
Age 34,6 34.7 30.2 36.9 37.1 34.2
Years of experience 18,0 18,2 13.6 20.2 20.4 17,6
Severe disability 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Less severe disability 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00
Stayers 0.82 1.00 0.00 0.78 1.00 0.00
Milit~ quitters 0.03 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.00 1.00
Still in appr. firm 0.26 0.32 0.00 0.30 0.38 0.00
Changed occupation 0.34 0.32 0.44 0.27 0.26 0.19
Changed OCC.but not firm 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01
continuedTable 1
Summary Statistics - continued
1979 Survey 1985/86 Survey
Variable all stayers military all stayers military
quilters quitters
Number of employers: 1 0.25 0.31 0.10 0.34 0.37 0.32
2 0.29 0.27 0.42 0.29 0.30 0.29
3 0.23 0.22 0.27 0.18 0.17 0.21
4 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.12
5 or more 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07
Characteristics of apprenticeship firm
sector: manufacturing 0.31 0.33 0.22 0.33 0.36 0.30
crafts 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.42
trade 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.16
services and other 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.12
fm size: 1-9 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.32
10-99 0.35 0.35 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.45
100-999 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.17
1000+ 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.06
continuedTable 1
Summary Statistics - continued
1979 Smey 1985/86 Survey I
Variable all stayers military all stayers military
quilters quitters
Characteristics of current job
Hourly wage (DM) 13.08 13.12 12.88
position: serni-skid.bluecol, 0.08 0.07 0.08
skilled blue collar I 0.35 I 0,35 I 0.32
master craftsman 0.11 0.12 0.01
low skilled white collar 0.09 0.09 0.13
qualified white collm 0.14 0,15 0.19 0.17 I 0.18 I 0.13
0.10 I 0.10 I 0.09 highly qualified/manager I 0.06 I 0.06 I 0.08
executive I 0.07 I 0.08 I 0.10
self-employed I 0.09 I 0.08 I 0.09
sector: manufacturing I 0.43 I 0.44 I 0.38 0.43 I 0.44 I 0.34
crafts I 0.21 I 0.21 I 0.16
*
trade 0.14 0.13 0.24
services and other 0.20 0.19 0.21
firm size: 1-9 0.20 0.19 0.21 0,23 I 0.22 I 0.26
10-99 I 0.33 I 0.33 I 0.41
100-999 0.26 0.27 0.19
1000+ 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.16 I 0.16 I 0.12
Use apprenticeship skill: no 0.12 0.10 0.13
little 0.06 0.06 0.10
some 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.16 I 0.16 I 0.14
much I 0.20 I 0.20 I 0.26 0,24 I 0,25 I 0.27
a lot I 0.48 I 0.50 I 0.36
Number of observations 4,367 3,586 135
Note: Data we from the German Qualification and Career Survey, Samples consist of German males, age 23-59, who
left secondary school in 1948 or later, completed private sector apprenticeship training without returning ;O school after
the apprenticeship, employed in the private sector outside construction, and working full time.Table 2
Basic Wage Regressions
(Dependent variable: Log average hourly earnings)
Independent variable 1979 Sulvey 1985/86 1984
Survey SOEP
Years of school 0.104 0.076 0.065
(0.009) (0.007) (0.013)
Experience 0.114 0.144 0.113
(0.038) (0.026) (0.086)
Expenence2/100 -0.503 -0.758 -0.727
(0.316) (0.212) (0.762)
Experience3/10,000 0.750 1.822 2.138
(1.100) (0.698) (2.777)
Experience’/l ,000,000 -0.029 -1.638 -2.291
(1.367) (0.806) (3.543)
Apprenticeship in 0.083 0.100
manufacturing (0.012) (0.012) ‘--
Apprenticeship in trade 0.070 0.067 ---
(0.018) (0.019)
Apprenticeship in other 0.053 0.029
sector (0.020) (0.019) ‘--
Severe disability -0.078 0.000 0.173
(0.041) (0.049) (0.110)
Less severe disability 0.009 -0.158 -0.152
(0.046) (0.042) (0.074)
Still in apprenticeship -0.032 -0.019
firm (0.013) (0.012) ‘--
Stayer 0.022 0.041 ---
(0.017) (0.016)
Military quitter 0.045 0.035
(0.028) (0.024) ‘--
Ever did milita~ --- --- -0.024
service (0.024)
R2 0.106 0.132 0.130
Note: see next pageNote to Table 2: White standard errors in parentheses. Samples in lhe first two columns are from the Qualification and
Career Survey and consist of German males, age 23-59, who left secondary school in 1948 or later, completed private
sector apprenticeship training without returning to school after the apprenticeship, employed in the private sector ouKide
construction, and working full time. Number of observations is 4,367 in 1979 and 4,917 in 1985/86. “Stayers” are those
workers who continued in their apprenticeship firm after training; “militruy quitters” are those who left their training firm
for military service. Sample in the last columns is from the socioeconomic pale] and consist of German males, age 23-
59, who left secondary school in 1948 or later, employed in the private sector outside construction, and working full time.
Number of observations is 526. Regressions also include a constant.Table 3
Specification Checks
(Dependent variable: Log average hourly earnings)






Controls for math and German 0.018
Erades in school (0.017)
No control for still working at the 0.012
apprenticeship firm (0.016)
Exclude self-em ployed 0.013
(0.016)
Exclude those with 120r more 0.022
years of school (0.017)
Only include those born after 1938 0.013
and include full set of age dummies (0.020)
Include those who left school before 0.021
1948 (0.016)
Only include respondents with -0.002






































Note: White standard errors in parentheses. Samples consist of German males, age 23-59, who left second~ school
in 1948 or later, completed private swtor apprenticeship training without returning to school after the apprenticeship,
employed in tie private sector outside construction, and working full time. “Stayers” are those workers who continued
in their apprenticeship firm after training; “military quitters” are those who left their training firm for military service.
Except where otherwise noted, additional controls are years of primary and secondary schooling, a quartic in potential
experience, three dummies for the sector of the apprenticeship firm, two dummies for work related disabilities, a dummy
for still working in the apprenticeship firm, and a constant.Table 4
Linear Probability Models for Ability Related Outcomes
1979 Survey 1985/86 Survey
Sample stayers military stayers military
quitters quitters
Dependent variable: Uses computer on-the-job
Full sample 0.012 -0.007 0.036 0.000
(0.011) (0.024) (0.015) (0.24)
Dependent variable: Works asshopfloor supervisor (’’Polier” or’’Meister”)
Full sample 0.025 -0.043 0.002
(0.013) (0.016) (0.012)
Blue collar and self-employed 0.040 -0.024 0.016
(0.012) (0.015) (0.016)





Full sample 0.020 -0.034 -0.009 -0.048
(0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.017)
Blue collar and self-employed 0.024 0.043 -0.005 -0.047
(0.017) (0.034) (0.016) (0.023)
Note: White standard errors in parentheses. Samples consist of German males, age 23-59, who left second~ school
in 1948 or later, completed private sector apprenticeship training wilhout returning to school after the apprenticeship,
employed in the private sector outside construction, and working full time. “Stayers” are those workers who continued
in their apprenticeship firm after training; “military quitters” are those who left their training firm for military service.
Additional controls are years of primary and seconcl~ schooling, a qumtic in potentird experience, three dummies for
the sector of the apprenticeship firm, two dummies for work related disabilities, a dummy for still working in the
apprenticeship fum and a constant.